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I. Development as an Environmental Issue
"Environment and development are not separate challenges; they
are inexorably linked. Development cannot subsist upon a
deteriorating environmental resource base; the environment cannot be
protected when growth leaves out of account the costs of
environmental destruction. These problems cannot be treated
separately by fragmented institutions and policies."'
As this quotation from the report of the World Commission on
Environment and Development clearly indicates, development is
inevitably an environmental issue. The Commission identified
population growth, food security, protection of species and
ecosystems, energy use, industrial production and urban life as the
major environmental challenges facing international policy makers.
These problems have an impact at three levels: national, bilateral and
global. They may contribute to pollution, to the depletion of natural
resources and ecosystems, and to the degradation of common spaces
including the atmosphere, the oceans and Antarctica.2
Because these problems affect other states and the global
environment, the traditional concept of territorial sovereignty within
which states have been free to pursue their own national development
policies, no longer meets contemporary needs.3 Principle 21 of the
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment for this
reason reflects a compromise between the competing claims of
development and environmental protection:
Faculty of Laws, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London.
1. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford,
1987), p. 37.
2. See generally L.K. Caldwell, International Environmental Policy (Durham N.C., 1984).
3. See Island of Palmas Case (1928) 2 R.I.A.A. 829.
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States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control
do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction.4
This compromise, aimed particularly at protecting the interests of
developing states, while reiterating their environmental obligations, has
been maintained in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, in the 1985
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its later
protocol, and in regional arrangements for the control of land-based
and airborne pollution.
Something of a double standard has thus emerged in the
formulation of environmental pollution norms. It is clear both that
much of the detailed regulation of pollution effected by international
agreement is mainly accepted only in the northern hemisphere
developed economies, and that developmental goals have inhibited
progress on issues such as ozone depletion, deforestation, biological
diversity and wildlife conservation in the underdeveloped world.5
Nevertheless, certain basic principles of environmental protection
appear to be widely accepted, even in the developing world. The
principle of sustainable development, adopted by U.N.E.P. and
articulated by the World Commission on Environment and
Development, now informs international conservation policy and has
4. Report on the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972, U.N. Doc.
AICONFI481141RE. I; L.B. Sohn, "The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment,"
(1973) 14 Harvard International Law Journal 423.
5. J.W. Kindt, "The Effect of Claims by Developing Countries on LOS International Marine
Pollution Negotiations" (1979) 20 Virginia Journal of International Law 313; A.E. Boyle, Regional
Pollution Agreements etc, in, W.E. Butler (ed) Law of the Sea and International Shipping (Dobbs
Ferry, 1985); C. Okidi, "Prospects for Co-operation Among Developing Countries in Legal Aspects
of Control of Transboundary Air Pollution," in, C. Flintermann et al., TransboundaryAir Pollution
(Dordrecht, 1986) and see in particular Stockholm Declaration, Principles 8-12,23; U.N.G.A. Res.
3002 (XXVII); 1987 Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer.
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begun to be reflected in international law governing the exploitation
of natural resources. 6
The Stockholm Declaration of 1972 represents a statement of
international policy regarding environmental protection goals,
including controls on the discharge of toxic substances, the prevention
of marine pollution and the rational management of resources.
Principle 21 of the Declaration is generally regarded as codifying an
obligation of customary international law to protect other states and the
global environment from pollution and environmental harm.7 Since
1972, the primary obligations of states in matters such as the control
of marine pollution, the conservation of migratory animals, and the
management of transboundary environmental risks have been clarified
by international agreement, state practice, and the declarations of
international organisations.'
In achieving these policy objectives a variety of approaches are
appropriate. In some cases economic policies may be useful, such as
the "polluter pay" principles favoured by O.E.C.D. as a means of
internalising environmental costs,9 or controls on trade, such as those
used to protect endangered species or the ozone layer. 0 The use of
international institutions to promote environmental goals is a second
possibility. Here the examples range from the introduction of
environmental assessment criteria by the World Bank and other
6. U.N.G.A. Res. 35/74 (1980); I.U.C.N. World Charter for Nature, 1982, endorsed by
U.N.E.P. Resolution 14/14 (1982) and U.N.G.A. Res. 37/7 (1982); World Commission on
Environment and Development, Legal Principles, Our Common Future, Annex I, and Ch. 2. See
also Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Case (1974) 1.C.J. Reports 3.
7. See U.S. and Canadian Comments in U.N. Doc. A/CONF/48/14/Rev.lat 64-66. U.N.G.A.
Res. 2996 (1972) asserts that Principles 21 and 22 of the Stockholm Declaration "Lay down the
basic rules governing the matter." 112 states voted for this resolution, none opposed.
8. See, e.g. J. Schneider, World Public Order of the Environment (London, 1973); A.C. Kiss,
"The International Protection of the Environment," in R. MacDonald and D. Johnston (eds.), The
Structure and Process of International Law (The Hague, 1983); P.W. Birnie, "Development of
International Environmental Law" (1977) 3 British Journal of International Studies 169.
9. O.E.C.D. Recommendations. C(72) 128 (1972); C(74) 223 (1974) and the "Declaration on
Environment Resources for the Future," adopted by member governments, 20 June, 1985, reprinted
in O.E.C.D., O.E.C.D. and the Environment (Paris, 1986), and see O.E.C.D., Economic
Instruments for Environmental Protection (Paris, 1989), at pp. 27-30.
10. See, e.g., 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species; 1987 Montreal
Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Art. 4.
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1993
development agencies. " The growing involvement of U.N.
Specialised Agencies such as I.M.O. or. I.A.E.A. in pollution
control, 12 to the creation of UNEP as a global organisation dedicated
to coordinating and developing international environmental policy. 13
A third approach involves the use of national, regional and
international legal systems to bring about the implementation of global
environmental policy. Although the utility of law as an instrument of
international policy should not be exaggerated in this context, much
attention has now been devoted to the development of international
environmental law and the supporting structures of the international
legal system. 4 The progress that has been made in these respects
ensures that the international legal system now provides a variety of
mechanisms for holding states or those under their jurisdiction
accountable for the implementation of environmental obligations. It
is to an examination of these mechanisms that the remainder of this
paper is devoted.
II. Accountability and the Implementation of
International Environmental Law
There are three main ways in which international law provides for
the implementation of environmental obligations:
- through inter-state claims based on the principle of state
responsibility,
- through national law, using in particular the principle of equal
access to national remedies and nondiscrimination, transboundary
11. P.R. Muldoon, "The International Law of Eco-Development: Emerging Norms for
Development Assistance Agencies," 22 Texas Int. Law Journal I (1987).
12. See below.
13. See U.N.G.A. Res. 2997 (1972); U.N.E.P. Nairobi Declaration, 1982.
14. See U.N.E.P. Montevideo Programme for the Development of Environmental Law, 1981;
W.C.E.D., Legal Principles and Recommendations, in R. Munro and J. Lammers, Environmental
Protection and Sustainable Developnwnt (London, 1986); 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Part XII; O.E.C.D., "Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution," Res C(74) 224 (1974);
I.L.C. Reports on "International Watercourses" and "Liability of States for Injurious Consequences
of Acts not Prohibited by International Law" in successive Yearbooks of the Commission from 1973
onwards.
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civil liability schemes, extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and the
individual right to a decent environment,
- through international institutions, using methods of inspection,
standard setting, reporting and review procedures to supervise and
ensure compliance with treaty obligations concerning pollution and
resource conservation.
A. Inter-State Claims: State Responsibility
State responsibility is the principle by which states may be held
accountable in international claims for a breach of their obligations."
This may involve proceedings before international arbitral tribunals or
the International Court of Justice, such as the well known Trail
Smelter Arbitration16 the Lac Lanoux Arbitration7 and the Nuclear
Tests Cases."8 Alternatively, states may press claims diplomatically
and negotiate settlements. 9
While potentially effective, this process has a number of
drawbacks. Firstly, cases must be taken up by states; the provision of
diplomatic protection is discretionary and the injured victim has no
control over the proceedings or over any settlement that results.2"
Moreover, the jurisdiction of international tribunals is rarely
compulsory; without agreement to resort to third party settlement,
claims can only be pressed by negotiation. 2
Secondly, the applicable principles of customary international law
are those which place obligations of conduct on states; they are not
15. I.L.C., Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Part I, (1980) 2 Yearbook of the .L. C., Pt.
II, p. 30, Art. 3.
16. (1939) 33 American Journal of InternationalLaw 182 and (1941) 35 American Journal of
Internadonal Law 684.
17. (1957) XII Reports of International Arbitration Awards 281.
18. (1974) I.C.J. Reports 253.
19. E.g., Claim for Damage Caused by Cosmos 954, 1979 (U.S.S.R. v. Canada).
20. Barcelona Traction Case (1970) I.C.J. Reports 4.
21. Statute of the 1.C.J., Art. 36.
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directly concerned with the conduct of individual polluters.'
Although it is beyond question that international law requires states to
refrain from causing serious damage to other states or the
environment,' and to conserve natural resources shared with other
states,2 the exact contours of these customary obligations are
unsettled. In pollution cases, it is unclear whether the obligation is
only one of diligent control of sources of harm, or whether states are
strictly responsible for the fact of harm, regardless of their efforts to
prevent it. The better view would seem to be that the obligation is
one of diligence only and thus unforeseeable or unavoidable harm may
not incur responsibility.2" In conservation cases, the principles of
reasonable or equitable use have been employed by international
tribunals and the International Law Commission as a basis for
determining rights, but the actual allocation of resources invariably
requires recourse to negotiation by the parties, supported only by the
principle of good faith. 6 Likewise, schemes of rational management
require agreement and cooperation." The high level of generality of
22. Corfu Channel Case (1949) l.C.J. Reports 4; 6. G. Handl, "State Responsibility for
Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private Persons" (1980) 74 American Journal
of International Law 525; J. de Arechaga, in, M. Sorensen, Manual of Public International Law
(London, 1968); Principle 21, Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, supra, note 4.
23. Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra, note 16; Corfu Channel Case, supra note 22; Principle
21, stockholm Declaration, supra, note 4; 1982, U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Arts.
192, 194.
24. Anglo Icelandic Fisheries Case, supra, note 6; Lac Lanoux Arbitration, supra, note 17;
U.N.E.P. Principles of Conduct Concerning Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States,
1978; 1979 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and National Habitats; 1979
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals; 1982 U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea, Arts. 61, 117.
25. P.M. Dupuy, in O.E.C.D., Legal Aspects of Transfrontier Pollution (Paris, 1977), p. 345,
but compare J. Barboza, (1987) U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/405, para. 60 and proposed draft articles on
international liability, (1989) U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/423, I.L.C., 41st Session, Arts. 8 and 9, and see
B. Smith, State Responsibility and the Marine Environment (Oxford, 1988).
26. Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Case, supra, note 6; Lac Lanoux Arbitration, supra, note 17;
I.L.C. Draft Articles on International Watercourses, 1988, U.N. Doec. A/43/10, Arts. 6,7; 1958
Geneva Convention on Conservation of Fisheries; 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Arts. 63, 64, 66, 118.
27. 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling; 1979 Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Animals.
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all these customary principles leads to serious uncertainty over the
specific obligations of states.
Thirdly, state responsibility is in most cases a principle which may
be invoked only by states with standing. In practice this means an
injured state, although for this purpose a violation of legal rights,
including rights under a multilateral treaty, may be a sufficient
injury.2" Where the injury is to the global commons, such as the
high seas, states may not on this view have standing to bring
proceedings before the I.C.J.29 Since this is a palpably undesirable
conclusion where community interests are at stake, the possibility
exists that certain environmental obligations may be treated as
enforceable by all states, as is now the case in human rights law.30
This would be the main consequence of adopting the International Law
Commission's view that "massive pollution of the atmosphere or the
seas" is an "international crime."3" However, where injury is caused
by a state to its own environment, the problem of standing remains a
significant one. Thus deforestation or ecosystem destruction with no
international effects may remain beyond the existing mechanisms of
accountability in international law unless covered by multilateral
commitments.
Finally, there are problems with the availability and scope of
remedies in cases of state responsibility. It is unclear whether the duty
to make reparation covers environmental injury not classifiable as
property damage or injury to health.32 Moreover the availability of
anticipatory remedies is in doubt following the Nuclear Tests Cases.33
28. I.L.C, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Part 2, Report of the LL.C., 40th Session
(1988) U.N. Doc. A/43/10, Art. 5; S. W Africa Case (1966) 1.C.J. Reports, p. 6, at p.32.
29. See Nuclear Tests Cases, supra, note 18, at pp. 386-390, per Judge de Castro, but compare
.Judge Barwick at pp. 437 ff.
30. Barcelona Traction Case, supra, note 20; J. Charney, "Third State Remedies for
Environmental Damage to the Global Commons," in F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi (eds.), State
Responsibility for Environmental Damage (Dordrecht, 1991).
31. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Part 1, Art. 19, (1980) 11 Yearbook of the LL.C.,
Pt. 2, p. 30; Part 2, Art. 5, supra, note 28.
32. Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 16; Nuclear Tests Cases, supra note 18; but compare
Cosmos 954 claim, supra, note 19.
33. Compare (1973) I.C.J. Reports 99, at 131, per Judge Ignacio Pinto, and (1974) .C.J.
Reports 253, at pp. 312 ff (joint dissent Dillard, Wadock, Onyeama and de Arechaga).
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For injuries to the global commons, states may be confined to
diplomatic protest or collective measures.'
But the most pertinent criticism of state responsibility as a model
for implementing international environmental law is that by itself it is
an insufficient guarantee of adequate standards of environmental
protection. Like tort law, it complements, but does not displace the
need for a more comprehensive scheme of regulation; such regulation
can only come about by agreement. It is for this reason that the
growing number of environmental treaties concluded since 1972 is
particularly significant.
B. National Law
National law is primarily important as a means of holding
individuals to account in environmental cases. Many treaties require
implementation in this way, typically by the imposition of criminal
penalties. Examples of this include the 1973 MARPOL Convention
and the 1972 London Dumping Convention. Fisheries conservation
and wildlife protection treaties are similarly enforced by their parties
through criminal sanctions. Moreover, in some cases such jurisdiction
may be exercised extra-territorially, for example by port states in
respect of high seas pollution offences, 35 or territorial jurisdiction
may be given an extended character for environmental purposes, as in
the exclusive economic zone provisions of the Law of the Sea
Convention.36
A second role for national legal systems is to provide a means of
reallocating transboundary environmental costs and facilitating
34. J. Charney, op. cit., supra note 30.
35. 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art, 218. Note also Art. 4 of the ILC's
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: "(I)" An offence against the
peace and security of mankind is a universal offence. Every state has the duty to try or extradite
any perpetrator of an offence against the peace and security of mankind arrested in its territory."
The articles define "any serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
safeguarding and preservation of the human environment" as such an offence: see (1986) II
Yearbook of the International Law Conunission, Pt. 2, pp. 41-44, and for examples, see 1977
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Arts. 35, 55.
36. Id., Arts. 56, 211, 220.
102
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
transboundary legal action by individual complainants. In this sense,
national proceedings operate as a complement or substitute for state
responsibility."
The principle of equal access and non-discrimination developed by
O.E.C.D. functions in this way." It involves removing jurisdictional
obstacles confronting foreign plaintiffs, and enables such plaintiffs to
commence administrative or judicial proceedings challenging the
legality of environmentally harmful activity or seeking damages in
cases of transboundary injuries.
Equal. access does not, however, involve harmonisation of legal
systems; thus liability in tort will vary according to the substantive
legal principles employed by each state. For this reason states have
in some cases gone further and established by treaty common schemes
of liability, which allow transboundary actions and reciprocal
enforcement. Examples of such schemes are found in treaties dealing
with nuclear accidents39 and oil pollution at sea.40  Apart from the
oil pollution scheme, this is not a widely supported approach, nor is
equal access commonly found outside Western Europe or North
America.4' In the absence of either feature, reliance on national
legal systems in transboundary cases will often be problematic and
unproductive.
The human right to a decent environment is a further possible
means of holding states accountable in national law for their
environmental policies. Principle 1 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration
recognised that "Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality
and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that
37. A.E. Boyle, "Making the Polluter Pay'? Alternatives to State Responsibility in the
Allocation of Transboundary Environmental Costs," in Francioni and Scovazzi, supra note 30.
38. Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, supra note 13; Rec. C(76) 55 (1976); Rec.
C(77) 28 (1977), reproduced in O.E. C.D. and the Environment (Paris, 1986). See also 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 235(2).
39. 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy; 1963
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; see A.E. Boyle, "Nuclear Energy and
International Law: An Environmental Perspective" (1989) British Yearbook cf International Law
286, at p. 297 ff.
40. 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, amended 1984. See D. W.
Abecassis and R.L. Jarashow, Oil Pollution from Ships, 2nd ed. (London, 1985),
41. A.E. Boyle, supra note 37.
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permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and
future generations." A number of constitutions now incorporate such
a right, despite obvious problems of definition and uncertainty over
whether it has an individual or collective character.42 Potentially it
presents those living in some developing countries with a claim to
have development policies reviewed on environmental grounds. NGOs
may also be able to rely on this right.43
C. International Institutions
The accountability of states to the members of international
organisations is perhaps the most significant approach to implementing
international environmental law, drawing on experience in the
monitoring of human rights treaties. The key roles which such
institutions can perform are those of information and data collection,
receiving reports on policy implementation by states, facilitating
independent monitoring and inspection, acting as a forum for
reviewing the performance of individual states, and negotiating the
adoption of further measures." Such bodies may thus acquire both
law enforcement and law-making roles. The International Maritime
Organisation is a good example of an international institution which
functions in this way, and, through its work, the regulation of marine
42. E.g. Greece, Constitution, Art. 24; Ecuador, Constitution, Art 19; Guyana, Constitution,
Art. 36; Rep. of Korea, Constitution, Art. 35 (I); Peru, Constitution, Art. 15; Portugal,
Constitution, Art. 9; Spain, Constitution, Art. 45; Turkey, Constitution, Art. 56; India,
Constitution, Art. 48(A).
43. P. Sands, "The Environment, Community and International Law" (1989) 30 Harvard
International Law Journal 393, at 412.
44. A.C. Kiss, "Mechanisms of Supervision of International Environmental Rules" in F.
Kashoven, F. Kuyper and J.G. Lammers (eds.), Essays on the Development of the International
Legal Order, (Alphen an der Rijn, 1980), p. 99; A. Contini and P. Sand, Methods to Expedite
Environment Protection: International Eco-standards, (1972) 66 Aerican Journal of International
Law 37; Stein, "The Potential of Regional Organisations in Managing Man's Environment," in, J.L.
Hargrove (ed.), Law Institutions and the Global Envirownent.
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pollution is now highly developed.45 Other global bodies such as the
International Atomic Energy Authority perform some of these tasks."
At a lower level, most pollution and conservation treaties now
make provision for appropriate institutional arrangements to ensure
regular meetings of the parties and a review of the operation of the
treaty concerned. Examples include the commissions dealing with
Antarctic marine living resources,47 land-based sources of marine
pollution,4 dumping at sea,"' trade in endangered species50 and
conservation of migratory animals and wildlife habitat.51
Apart from the benefits of avoiding enforcement through state
responsibility and hostile legal proceedings, such arrangements give
treaties a dynamic character and enable the parties to respond to new
problems.52 The operation of the Antarctic Treaty System is a
particularly good illustration of this feature." Through periodic
review meetings, the parties to this system have negotiated treaties to
regulate the conservation of seals, 5' marine living resources, 55
minerals exploitation and its environmental impact 6 and agreed
measures to protect flora and fauna on land. 7 To the extent that the
proceedings of these bodies are public and open to representations
from interested individuals or NGOs, the accountability of states for
their environmental performance is enhanced.
III. Conclusion
45. See, e.g., 1973 Marine Pollution Convention; 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention.
46. A.E. Boyle, supra note 39.
47. 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.
48. 1974 Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources.
49. 1972 London Dumping Convention; 1972 Oslo Dumping Convention.
50. 1973 CITES Convention.
51. 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals; 1979
Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats.
52. S. Lyster, International Wildlife Law (Cambridge, 1985), p. 12.
53. See 1959 Antarctic Treaty, Art. IX; F. Francioni and
T. Scovazzi, International Law for the Antarctic (Milan, 1987).
54. 1972 Convention for Conservation of Antarctic Seals.
55. See note 47.
56. 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, and see A.D.
Watts, (1990) 39 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 169.
57. Agreed measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna, 1964.
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The three main approaches to environmental accountability
reviewed here all have a role to play in ensuring that environmental
obligations are taken seriously and given adequate weight against
developmental priorities. Actions for damages or reparation help
redirect transboundary environmental costs back to the polluter or the
states which allows harmful activities, thus, in economic jargon,
internalising the real 'cost of development. 8 Criminal penalties
control the actions of individual violators and help implement the
performance of internationally agreed policies. International
organisations help to develop the law and hold states accountable for
their performance.
It is perhaps the last of these methods which is the most
important, since it represents the international community's primary
model for regulation of international environmental risks. Particularly
in those cases where the environmental problem is of global character,
and no single state's acts are responsible, such as global warming and
ozone depletion, this is probably the only solution likely to be
effective. 9 In these cases neither state responsibility nor individual
legal actions can have more than peripheral or residual impact.'
Thus, in the development of an international legal system capable of
meeting the environmental needs of the future in a sufficiently flexible
and effective way, the concept of international regulation, and its
practical operation, must be the major focus of attention. The
problems of reconciling development and environment remain, but as
negotiations on a protocol to the Ozone Convention illustrate, here at
least is a possible method of effecting this reconciliation.
58. This point should not be exaggerated however: see A.E. Boyle, Loc. cit. supra note 37.
59. See, e.g., the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its 1987
Montreal Protocol.
60. The same point may be true of long-range transboundary air pollution: see M.
Pallemaerts, "International Legal Aspects of Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution" (1988)
Annuaire de La Haye de Droit International 189, at p. 204 ff.
